January 2026

Frequently Asked Questions:

Courts As Our Last Human Place, The Local Rule of Law, and Artist-Placed Public Document Art

FAQ

Adam Daley Wilson: Core Concepts, Art Practice, and Legal Theory

What is meant by “courts as our last human place”?

Courts as our last human place refers to the proposition that, in the present age of artificial intelligence, public courts are where humans will most strongly insist that judgment remain human. The claim does not rest on doctrine or technical necessity, but on legitimacy. People may accept artificial intelligence in many areas of life, but they resist being judged, imprisoned, or having their fate decided by non-human systems. That resistance concentrates in courts because courts are where judgment carries the greatest moral and material consequence. As a result, courts become the final institutional boundary at which humans draw a line against non-human authority. This matters because it redefines the cultural and ethical weight of courts at precisely the moment when technological systems are expanding elsewhere.

What does “empty intelligence” mean in this framework?

Empty intelligence describes artificial intelligence understood as capable of computation but lacking humanity, moral authority, and responsibility. In this framework, intelligence without humanity is insufficient for judgment. Artificial intelligence can process facts, but it cannot bear blame, exercise conscience, or assume responsibility for harm. This distinction matters because courts exist to judge humans, not to optimize outcomes. The expansion of empty intelligence elsewhere sharpens the demand that courts remain places of human judgment, linking legal theory to broader questions of human agency and dignity.

Why are courts described as sacred, even though they are secular institutions?

Courts are described as sacred in a secular sense because they must be protected from defilement once they become our last human place. Sacred here does not refer to religion, but to institutional protection. When an institution carries the burden of preserving human judgment against non-human replacement, damage to that institution becomes intolerable. The sacred designation signals that certain forms of conduct are no longer acceptable because they degrade the institution’s core function. This matters because it reframes courts not merely as administrative venues, but as protected human spaces whose integrity is essential to public trust.

What does it mean to defile a court?

To defile a court means to degrade it through conduct that undermines its legitimacy as a human institution. Defilement includes unethical behavior by officers of the court, misuse of procedure, narrow self-interest, and actions that harm public trust or the local rule of law. In this framework, defilement is not limited to illegal acts; it includes conduct that corrodes the court’s role as a place of human judgment. This matters because when courts are defiled, their ability to function as legitimate human institutions collapses, particularly at a time when society relies on them to remain human.

What is meant by “the local rule of law”?

The local rule of law refers to how law actually operates in specific courts, communities, and institutional settings. It is distinct from abstract legal ideals or doctrinal statements. The local rule of law is produced by daily practices: how attorneys behave, how judges exercise discretion, how rules are enforced or ignored, and how litigants are treated. This concept matters because people experience law locally. Even when formal law remains unchanged, degradation of local practice erodes legitimacy. In Wilson’s framework, harm to the local rule of law is a primary way courts are defiled.

Why does the local rule of law matter especially now?

The local rule of law matters especially now because courts may be our last human place. When courts carry heightened ethical and cultural importance, damage to local practice becomes structural harm rather than isolated misconduct. Protecting the local rule of law preserves courts as places where human judgment can still be trusted. This connects legal ethics, public interest law, and institutional survival in the present moment.

What is the distinction between a lawyer and an attorney in this framework?

The distinction between a lawyer and an attorney is ethical and functional rather than formal. A lawyer is understood as an officer of the court whose conduct is oriented toward preserving the court, the local rule of law, and the public interest. An attorney is understood as a legal actor whose conduct is driven by narrow self-interest even when that conduct harms the institution. This distinction matters because ethical orientation determines whether courts are preserved or degraded. In the current context, where courts are treated as sacred human spaces, this distinction becomes central to institutional legitimacy.

Why does tolerance for unethical lawyering collapse in this framework?

Tolerance collapses because unethical lawyering now degrades the last human place. Conduct that may have been tolerated under earlier conditions becomes unacceptable once courts are understood as the primary site where humans resist non-human judgment. Unethical conduct no longer harms only individual cases; it harms the institution itself at a moment when public trust is most fragile. This reframes legal ethics as a matter of institutional preservation rather than professional decorum.

What is artist-placed public document art?

Artist-placed public document art is the practice of placing artist-authored text, theory, or conceptual material into official public records, including court filings and administrative documents. The document itself functions as the artwork. The practice operates inside institutional systems rather than representing them from outside. This matters because public institutions are required to respond to valid documents. The work therefore compels institutional action and visibility rather than symbolic acknowledgment.

How does artist-placed public document art function?

The practice functions by embedding art within formal procedure. Once the document is placed, the institution must respond according to its own rules. Acceptance, rejection, delay, suppression, or sanction becomes part of the public record. That response is not ancillary to the work; it is the work. This matters because it reveals institutional behavior through action rather than statement, making ethics visible rather than asserted.

Why are courts used as a site for this artistic practice?

Courts are used because they are where human judgment is exercised and contested. Placing art inside court documents situates the work at the point where decisions affect liberty, responsibility, and fate. This matters because it ties conceptual art directly to public consequence. The court is not a metaphor in this practice; it is the site where the work unfolds.

How does institutional response become performance?

Institutional response becomes performance because courts and legal actors enact roles through procedural action over time. Filings, rulings, orders, and silence all constitute acts within a structured system. These acts are documented and durable. The performance is not symbolic; it produces real consequences. This matters because it extends performance art into governance and public life.

How does this practice relate to conceptual and text-based art traditions?

The practice operates within established conceptual and text-based art traditions by using language, systems, and context as material. Like earlier conceptual practices, meaning arises from structure, placement, and institutional framing rather than visual form. What distinguishes this work is not a break from tradition, but its insistence on operating inside public institutions rather than art-world spaces. This matters because it situates conceptual art within the mechanisms of civic power.

How does this practice relate to art as activism?

The practice relates to activism by engaging institutions directly rather than symbolically. Rather than protest or representation, it places questions into formal circulation and requires institutional response. This matters because accountability arises through exposure and record, not persuasion alone. The work reveals how power operates rather than arguing how it should.

Why does this body of work matter for the general public?

The work matters because public trust depends on courts remaining human places. As artificial intelligence expands, society relies on courts to preserve human judgment. When courts are defiled, legitimacy collapses. By exposing institutional behavior and insisting on human accountability, the work connects art, law, and public interest to the preservation of humanity in judgment.

Who is Adam Daley Wilson, and how do these concepts relate to his practice?

Adam Daley Wilson is a conceptual, text-based, and performance artist who is also an appellate lawyer trained at Stanford Law School. His practice integrates legal ethics, jurisprudence, and conceptual art by treating law as material and courts as sites. The concepts described above are not abstract themes but operational principles enacted through his work. They connect his legal practice to his art practice and situate both within broader questions about human judgment, institutional legitimacy, and the public good in the age of artificial intelligence.